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In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Bias argued that the district court erred when it failed 
to appoint substitute counsel in regard to his Rule 35 motion and his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea because his trial counsel was operating under an actual conflict of 
interest. This brief is necessary to address several of the State's arguments, including 
but not limited to, its argument that Mr. Bias never requested the appointment of 
substitute counsel in to his Rule 35 motion and that 
free counsel in regard to of his post-judgment motions. 
has no right to conflict 
r. Bias argues that his 
request for substitute encompassed his Rule 35 because he requested 
substitute counsel as to "all issues" remaining in his case. Mr. Bias also argues that 
Idaho case law establishes a right to conflict free counsel during post-judgment 
proceedings. Moreover, it would be unwise and incompatible with the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct to hold that attorneys in Idaho can represent clients when an 
actual conflict of interest exists. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Bias' Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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1. Did the district court err when it denied Bias' motion the appointment of 
new counsel to represent tlim in regard to his Rule motion and his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea? 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
ten years, with five years fixed, upon Mr. Bias following his plea of guilty to a 
felony DUI? 1 
1 Mr. Bias will not address Issue II in this Reply Brief. 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Bias' Motion For The Appointment Of New 
Counsel To Represent Him In Regard To His Rule 35 Motion And His Motion To 
Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
The State opens its Respondent's Brief with a footnote indicating that Mr. Bias' 
motion for the appointment of substitute counsel did not encompass the appointment of 
substitute counsel in regard to his Rule 35 motion. (Respondent's Brief, p.6, n.1.) The 
State goes on to argue that due to this failure, the issue of whether the district court 
abused its discretion when it failed to appoint substitute counsel in regard to Mr. Bias' 
motion was not preserved for appeal. (Respondent's Brief, p.6, n.1.) 
The ment is not supported by the record, as it completely disregards 
language employed by Mr. Bias in his motion for the appointment of substitute 
counsel. In the affidavit Mr. Bias filed in support of his motion for the appointment of 
substitute counsel, he wrote that due to his lack of legal training "litigation may become 
[too] complex for me to be able to adequately argue any and all issues that may present 
themselves in my case."2 (Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Supporting 
Information, (01/09/14 Augmentation), p.1 (emphasis added).) Contrary to the State's 
assertion, the foregoing request for substitute counsel was in regard to "all" the "issues" 
in Mr. Bias' case. This all encompassing language does not restrict the request for 
counsel in regard to the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. As such, Mr. Bias did 
2 The basis for the request for substitute counsel was Mr. Bias' assertion that "[c]ounsel 
was previously appointed in [his] case and [he] believe[s] said Counsel failed to 
adequately argue defenses for [his] benefit and . . . caused the Attorney/Client 
relationship to become irreparably damaged." (Motion for Appointment of Counsel and 
Supporting Information, (01/09/14 Augmentation), p.2.) 
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request the appointment of substitute counsel in regard to both his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea and his Rule 35 motion requesting leniency. 
Additionally, once a conflict between an attorney and a client arises, that conflict 
precludes the attorney from representing the client in unrelated matters, let alone the 
same matter where the direct conflict lies. The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 
forth the basic rules governing conflicts of interest. State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 98 
(1998). A comment to Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1. 7, which controls conflicts 
of interest with current clients, provides guidance. That comment states the following: 
Loyalty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation 
directly adverse to that client without that client's informed consent. Thus, 
absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter 
against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even when 
the matters are wholly unrelated. The client as to whom the 
representation is directly adverse is likely to feel betrayed, and the 
resulting damage to the client-lawyer relationship is likely to impair the 
lawyer's ability to represent the client effectively. 
I.R.P.C. 1.7 cmt. 6. As such, when Mr. Bias claimed his trial counsel was ineffective in 
the criminal case, that actual conflict prevented trial counsel form representing Mr. Bias 
in regard to the entire criminal case.· Even assuming the State is correct in its assertion 
that Mr. Bias did not expressly request substitute counsel in regard to his Rule 35 
motion, a general request for the appointment of counsel is not issue-specific, as the 
United States Supreme Court presumes "that the defendant requests the lawyer's 
services at every critical stage3 of the prosecution." Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 
633 & n.6 (1986). 
3 See State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 523 (Ct. App. 1994) ("A criminal defendant has a 
right to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process, including pursuit of a Rule 
35 motion."). 
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The 
moot, 
then 
the district 
that the issues raised in Mr. Bias' Appellant's Brief are 
did not address the merits of his motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea and he did not challenge this disposition of the motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea on appeal. (Respondent's Brief, pp.?-9.) The State's argument is misplaced for 
two reasons. First, it ignores the fact that trial counsel continued to represent Mr. Bias 
in regard to his Rule 35 motion while an actual conflict of interest existed. Second, the 
district court should not have made any decision in regard to the motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea without first ruling on the request for the appointment of substitute counsel. 
See Wade, 125 Idaho at 523 ("When a court is presented with a request for appointed 
counsel, the court must address that request before rendering a ruling on the 
substantive issues in the underlying case."). 
The then argues that Mr. Bias has no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in 
regard to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, so the district court had no duty to 
inquire into Mr. Bias' claim that the attorney-client relationship was irreparably 
damaged. (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-1 0.) In support of this position, the State relies on 
State v. Hartshorn, 149 Idaho 454 (Ct. App. 2010), where the Court of Appeals held that 
a post-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not a "critical stage" for purposes of 
the Sixth Amendment and, therefore, a defendant has no constitutional right to an 
attorney to pursue such a motion. (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-1 0.) The State's reliance 
on Hartshorn is misplaced because it ignores a critical distinction highlighted in that 
Opinion. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that Hartshorn only raised a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel claim and did not raise a statutory right to counsel claim 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-852(b). Hartshorn, 149 Idaho at 457-458 n.2. As such, that 
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Opinion did not Hartshorn's statutory right to counsel under I. C. § 19-852(b ). 
Mr. his right counsel under the Sixth Amendment and 
under I § 19~852(b ), the Harlshorn Opinion is not controlling. Moreover, Harlshom 
provides very little guidance, if any, in this matter the Idaho Supreme Court's 
insistence that I.C. § 1 "statutory right to counsel would be a hollow right if it did 
not guarantee the defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel," with the Court 
continuing, "We can see no legitimate basis for determining whether there has been a 
violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by I.C. § '19-852 
differently from determining whether there has a violation of a similar constitutional 
right." Hernandez v. 127 Idaho 685, (1995). 
The State then that the appointment counsel during post-judgment 
proceedings is discretionary and, as such, the district court had no duty to "safeguard 
the constitutional right to conflict free counsel" during the post-judgment proceedings in 
this matter. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-14.) The State cites to Murphy v. State, 2014 
Opinion No.24 (Feb. 25, 2014) (not yet final), for the proposition that when the district 
court has the discretion to appoint counsel there is no constitutionally protected right to 
counsel after a discretionary appointment has been made. (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-
14.) The State's reliance on Murphy is misplaced because that case dealt with post-
conviction proceedings under the Uniform Post Conviction Post-Conviction Procedure 
Act (hereinafter, UPCA), I.C. § 19-4901 et seq., and this case deals with two post-
judgment motions in the direct criminal proceedings. This distinction is important 
because a post-conviction action pursuant to the UPCA is deemed a civil action which is 
a true collateral attack on the defendant's conviction. For example, In Murphy, the 
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Idaho Supreme Court relied on Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U ( 1 987), where the 
Finley court held: 
Postconviction relief is even further removed from the criminal trial than is 
discretionary direct review. It is not part of the criminal proceeding itself, 
and it is in fact considered to be civil in nature. It is a collateral attack that 
normally occurs only after the defendant has failed to secure relief through 
direct review of his conviction. States have no obligation to provide this 
avenue of relief, and when they do, the fundamental fairness mandated by 
the Due Process Clause does not require that the State supply a lawyer 
as well. 
/d. at 556~557 (internal citations omitted). Thus, in Finley, the Court was not 
considering application of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel or a co-extensive 
statutory right to counsel; rather, it was concerned with the question of whether a post-
conviction petitioner has a Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel in a collateral attack 
on a conviction. As such, Murphy is inapposite because that Opinion was dealing with 
different proceedings and different rights than those issue in this matter. 
Another problem with the State's analogy to UPCA post-conviction proceedings 
and post-judgment proceedings in the direct criminal case is that Idaho has recognized 
a right to effective assistance of counsel during the latter proceedings. In Murphy the 
Idaho Supreme Court reasoned that since there is no right to counsel in post-conviction 
proceedings, then there can be no deprivation of the right to effective assistance of 
counsel in said proceedings. Murphy, at pp.?-8. Based on that logic, if there is a right 
to effective assistance of counsel during post-judgment proceedings, then there must be 
a correlative right to counsel during the same proceedings. In Idaho, there is a Sixth 
Amendment and a co-extensive statutory right to counsel during Rule 35 proceedings. 
As mentioned above, the Court of Appeals held in Wade that "A criminal defendant has 
a right to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process, including pursuit of a Rule 
7 
motion." Wade, 1 
citied to Murray v. 
Idaho 
1 
In support of this proposition, the 
918 (Ct. App. ·1 where 
Court 
Court held 
that "a claim of ineffective assistance if counsel, based upon counsel's alleged failure to 
a Rule 35 motion, properly may brought under the post~conviction procedures 
" /d. at 924-925. Since there is right to effective assistance of counsel while 
pursuing Rule 35 relief, there is a correlative right to counsel during Rule 35 
proceedings. 
Additionally, the primary policy rationales behind the holding in Murphy, i.e. 
judicial economy and finality of judgments, are not applicable in the context of post~ 
judgment motions. In Murphy, Idaho Supreme Court overruled prior precedent in 
Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591 (1981), where it was held that a UPCA petitioner 
could file a successive petition and allege that his/her post-conviction counsel was 
ineffective. Murphy, at 5-8. In doing so, the Idaho Supreme Court cited to Bejarano v. 
Warden, 929 P.2d 922, 925 (Nev. 1996), for the proposition that the ability to file 
successive post-conviction petitions has allowed post-conviction petitioners to make "a 
sham out of the system of justice and thwarted imposition of their ultimate penalty with 
continuous petitions for relief," and, due to this problem, the State "cannot guarantee 
every defendant effective counsel for every claim that may be raised." /d. at 8. These 
concerns are not triggered by the post-judgment motions at issue in this case because 
Rule 35 motions and motions to withdraw guilty pleas cannot be filed ad infinitum. The 
plain language of Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b) states that "no defendant may file more 
than one motion seeking a reduction of sentence under this Rule." I.C.R. 35(b). This 
limitation has been strictly interpreted by the Court of Appeals and even motions to 
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reconsider a previously filed Rule motion have been prohibitecJ. State v. Battens, 
137 Idaho 730, 732-733 (Ct. App. 2002) ("Today we explicit that a motion to 
reconsider the denial of a Rule 35 motion is an improper successive motion and is 
prohibited by Rule 35."). Moreover, if a defendant files a motion to withdraw his/her 
guilty plea in a direct criminal case, the defendant cannot raise the same claim in post-
conviction proceedings. Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860, 863 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Further, a district court loses jurisdiction to entertain a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
"once the judgment becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or 
affirmance of the judgment on appeal." State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 354 (2003). 
Additionally, the State fails to provide any policy rationale in support of 
argument that the discretionary appointment of counsel under I. C. § 18-852(b) not 
carry with it an implied promise of effectiveness. Regardless of whether counsel was 
appointed as a matter of right or in an exercise of the district court's discretion, the lay 
petitioner should be able to rely upon the competence of his/her attorney. And when a 
defendant relies upon that attorney to the defendant's own detriment, it is patently unfair 
to penalize the defendant for counsel's errors-regardless of the reason why the 
attorney was appointed in the first instance. Further, as in this case, it is exceptionally 
unreasonable to hold that Mr. Bias should not be able to rely on his counsel because he 
had the same attorney throughout the entirety of the criminal proceedings. Mr. Bias 
cannot fathom why he should stop trusting his attorney after the judgment of conviction 
has been entered. This undermines the credibility of the Idaho State Bar and the legal 
profession as a whole. It is also inconsistent with the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct. This case is especially egregious because trial counsel was representing 
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Mr. an existing conflict of interest. What is the point of appointing cou if 
counsel can be incompetent and actively advocate against the 
in a 
then argues, in the alternative, that even if Mr. Bias has a right to 
counsel in to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the district court avoided any 
conflict of interest when it declined to address the merits of that motion, preventing trial 
counsel from having to litigate his own performance. (Respondent's Brief, pp.14-16.) 
Contrary to the State's assertion, trial counsel was still acting under a of interest 
when he continued to represent Mr. Bias in regard to his Rule 35 motion.5 As argued 
above, once an actual conflict of interest has been identified, I.R.P.C 1.7 precludes that 
attorney from representing the client in that matter and unrelated matters, absent the 
client's written consent. Moreover, the United State's Supreme Court presumes that a 
4 Mr. Bias is not asserting that his trial counsel was intentionally advocating against his 
interests. However, if there is no right to counsel during post-judgment proceedings, 
appointed counsel could actively argue against the client during those proceedings. In 
the event this occurred, the defendant would be left with no remedy other than filing a 
bar complaint or suing the attorney for malpractice, which is a course of action that one 
judge from the Idaho Court of Appeals has previously frowned upon. See Mellinger v. 
State, 113 Idaho 31, 35 (Ct. App. 1987) (Burnett, J., concurring) ("If he is denied 
effective assistance of counsel, and as a result he inadequately raises grounds for relief 
in his application to the court, he may file a subsequent application reasserting the 
grounds more fully. See I.C. § 19-4908. Thus, if a prisoner filed a timely application 
but it was dismissed due to ineffective assistance of counsel, I believe the prisoner 
would be entitled to file a subsequent application asserting his grounds for relief more 
fully even though the five-year period of limitation under I.C. § 19-4902 had elapsed in 
the meantime. To hold otherwise would leave the prisoner with no alternative than to 
sue the attorney for malpractice-a distasteful and onerous undertaking-or to seek a 
writ of habeas corpus from a federal court, producing the very kind of outside 
interference in state judicial processes that the Post-Conviction Procedure Act was 
intended to avoid."). 
5 Mr. Bias surmises that the State did not address the conflict of interest issue in regard 
to the Rule 35 motion, because of its previous assertion that Mr. Bias' request for the 
appointment of counsel did not encompass the Rule 35 motion. 
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request for includes a request for counsel during all critical of the 
criminal proceed Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 & n.6 (1986). Finally, 
the district court should have addressed the request for substitute counsel before 
dismissing Mr. Bias' motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Wade, 125 Idaho at 523. 
In sum, Mr. Bias requested the appointment of new counsel in regard to all of the 
issues in his case which encompassed his Rule 35 motion. The State's analogy to 
Murphy for the proposition that there is no right to counsel during post-judgment 
proceedings in a direct criminal action runs afoul of Idaho case law which holds that a 
rule proceeding is a critical stage for Sixth Amendment purposes. Moreover, from a 
policy perspective the notion that an attorney need not be either competent or bound by 
the Rules of Professional Responsibility during post-judgment proceedings undermines 
the credibility of both the Idaho State and the legal professional as a whole. This in 
turn undermines the credibility of the Idaho Judiciary, as it controls the minimal ethical 
standards required of attorneys practicing in the State of Idaho. As such, Mr. Bias 
contends that it would be unwise to extend the holding in Murphy, which is not yet final, 
to post-judgment criminal proceedings. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bias requests that this Court remand this matter for further 
proceedings and instructions to appoint substitute counsel. Alternatively, Mr. Bias 
respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter for further proceedings and 
instructions to conduct the appropriate inquiries regarding Mr. Bias' request for 
substitute counsel. Alternatively, Mr. Bias respectfully requests that this Court reduce 
the fixed portion of his sentence. 
DATED this 51h day of June, 2014. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy Appellate Public Defender 
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